Abstract. In the CT-track of the 2006 RSA conference, a new multivariate public key cryptosystem, which is called the Medium Field Equation (MFE) multivariate public key cryptosystem, is proposed by Wang, Yang, Hu and Lai. We use the second order linearization equation attack method by Patarin to break MFE. Given a ciphertext, we can derive the plaintext within 2 23 F 2 16 -operations, after performing once for any public key a computation of complexity less than 2 52 . We also propose a high order linearization equation (HOLE) attack on multivariate public key cryptosystems, which is a further generalization of the (first and second order) linearization equation (LE). This method can be used to attack extensions of the current MFE.
Introduction
For the last three decades, public key cryptosystems, as a revolutionary breakthrough in cryptography, have developed into an indispensable element of our modern communication system. For RSA and other number theory based cryptosystems, their security depends on the assumption about the difficulty of certain number theory problems, such as the Integer Prime Factorization Problem or the Discrete Logarithm Problem. However, due to the quantum computer attack by Shor [Sho99] and the demand for more efficient cryptosystems for small devices, there is a great challenge to build new public key cryptosystems, in particular ones that could survive future attacks utilizing quantum computers [PQ] .
One such research direction utilizes a set of multivariate polynomials over a finite field, in particular, quadratic polynomials, as the public key of the cipher, which are called multivariate public key cryptosystems (MPKC). This method is based on the proven theorem that solving a set of multivariate quadratic polynomial equations over a finite field generally is an NP-complete problem. Note, however, this does not guarantee that these new cryptosystems are secure. In the last decade, there has been tremendous amount of work devoted to this area. In 2004, one such cryptosystem, Sflash [ACDG03] [PCG01a] , was accepted as one of the final selections in the New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity, and Encryption: IST-1999-12324 . A more efficient family of Rainbow signature schemes was also proposed last year [DS05] [YC05] [WHLCY05] .
In the development of MPKC, one particular interesting and important new area is the development of the so-called algebraic attack. This new attack method started from the linearization equation (LE) attack by Patarin [Pat95] , which is used to break Matsumoto Later, Patarin, Courtois, Shamir, and Kipnis generalized this method by multiplying high order terms u α1 1 · · · u αn n of the plaintext variables but using only linear terms of ciphertext variables (v j ), which is called the XL method [CKPS00] . The method is closely related to the new Gröbner basis method by Faugere [Fau99] [AFIKS04] . Furthermore, this new algebraic method was used to attack symmetric ciphers like AES and others [CPi02] . One can see that algebraic attacks are becoming increasingly important in cryptography.
Another generalization of LE also by Patarin [Pat96] [PCG01a] [C00], which is not as well-known, is the type of equations in the form:
As a further extension, we propose to call the equations that use high order terms of the ciphertext variables (v j ) while using only linear terms of plaintext variables (u i ), high order linearization equations (HOLE Given a multivariate public key cryptosystem, the public key is defined as a map over the vector space K n , where K is a small finite field with q elements. However from the theory of finite fields, K n can also be identified with a "big" finite field E, which is a degree n extension of K. That is, there is a standard K-linear vector space isomorphism that identifies E with K n . The idea of the "Big Field" is that we can find a map, say φ 2 , that is easy to invert on E. Under the isomorphism we can build a mapφ 2 : K n → K n as:
Then we use φ 1 and φ 3 , two randomly chosen invertible affine linear maps over K n which are the key part of the private key to "hide" φ 2 . The public key is given byφ
The Matsumoto-Imai (MI) cryptosystem was broken by Patarin [Pat95] , and later Patarin developed the HFE cryptosystem [Pat96] . The only difference between HFE and the MI is that they choose different φ 2 . Currently the more promising cryptosystems are new variants of the MI and the HFE through Oil-Vinegar constructions and internal perturbations [Din04a] DS04a] . The idea to put several "big fields" together to build a cryptosystem is also used [MI88] [Pat96] . The new MFE cryptosystem [WYH06] uses what the designers call "Medium Field Encryption". The non-linear critical part of the public key is a function over an extension of the base field K of degree smaller than what would be called the "big field". Another key difference between MFE and HFE is that MFE uses functions derived from a matrix structure while the MI and the HFE use only polynomials of a single variable.
In the attack on MFE, we first use second order linearization equations (SOLEs), which we derive from the special algebraic structure of the crucial nonlinear map in MFE. This is the most essential step in our attack. Any given ciphertext can be inserted into the SOLEs to produce a set of equations linear in the plaintext variables. Solutions to these equations are finally plugged back into the original public key polynomial equations, providing a set of new quadratic equations that could be easily solved. The complexity of our break is less than 2 52 one-time computations over K for any given public key, and the practical complexity of recovering a ciphertext is less than 2 23 K-operations. The current MFE is based on matrices of size 2 × 2 and one may extend it to a construction using matrices of bigger size. The HOLEs of higher order can be extended to attack such an extension of the current MFE and the order of HOLE corresponds exactly to the size of the matrices.
We organize the paper as follows. We introduce the MFE cryptosystem in Section 2, and present our attack in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the connection of HOLE with the XL method. In the final section, we present the conclusion.
MFE Public Key Cryptosystem
Let K be a finite field, generally F 2 16 . Let L be its degree r extension field; L is considered the "Medium Field". In MFE, we always identify L with K r by a Klinear isomorphism π : L → K r . Namely we take a basis of L over K, {θ 1 , · · · , θ r }, and define π by π(a 1 θ 1 + · · · + a r θ r ) = (a 1 , · · · , a r ) for any a 1 , · · · , a r ∈ K. It is natural to extend π to two K-linear isomorphisms π 1 : L 
Here Q 1 , Q 2 , and Q 3 form a triple (Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 ) which is a triangular map from
The q i can be any randomly chosen quadratic polynomials. A specific "tower"-structural choice for them is given in §5 of [WYH06] .
The encryption of MFE is the evaluation of public key polynomials, namely given a plaintext (u 1 , · · · , u 12r ), its ciphertext is
Given a valid ciphertext (v 1 , · · · , v 15r ), the decryption of MFE is to calculate in turn φ
Here the point is how to invert φ 2 , its basic idea is to use the triangular structure of φ 2 . Relating to our cryptanalysis, the method of computing φ −1 2 is listed as follows, see §4.2 and Appendix B of [WYH06] .
When M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 are all invertible, we can get values of det(M 1 ), det(M 2 ), and det(M 3 ) from det(Z 1 ), det(Z 2 ), and det( 
to get in turn x 1 , · · · , x r , x r+1 , · · · , x 2r , x 2r+1 , · · · , and x 3r . Thus, we recover X 1 , X 2 , and X 3 . From X 1 X 4 +X 2 X 3 = det(M 1 ) we then get X 4 provided X 1 = 0. The X 5 , · · · , X 12 are consequently solved from the 4th to 11th equations of (2). Appendix B of [WYH06] presents the method of computing the X i in the case when X 1 = 0. It is slightly easier than the case of X 1 = 0.
If there is a non-invertible matrix among M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 , then the decryption mentioned above will not work. This decryption failure exists in MFE [WYH06] . We call a plaintext singular if its corresponding M 1 , M 2 , and M 3 are not all invertible, otherwise it is called nonsingular. The ciphertext of a nonsingular plaintext is called a nonsingular ciphertext.
It is easy to prove that the ratio of singular plaintexts to all possible plaintexts is at most 4|L| −1 ; when L = F 2 64 , the ratio is at most 2 −62 , which is quite small. In the next section we only consider how to recover nonsingular ciphertext.
There are two typical instances of MFE proposed by the designers of MFE. 1) MFE-1, where K = F 2 16 and r = 4. The public key has 60 polynomials with 48 variables.
2) MFE-1 , where K = F 2 16 and r = 5. The public key has 75 polynomials and 60 variables.
There is also a mini-version of MFE (MFE-0) using K = F 2 8 and r = 4, which has the same number of polynomials and variables as MFE-1.
Cryptanalysis on MFE
The designers of MFE noted they should avoid the linearization attack of Patarin ( §6.2 of [WYH06] ), and this is indeed the case. In the design of MFE, the last equations of (3) in MFE are defined such that
; this would have produced linearization equations for the cryptosystem. However we can use the HOLE, in particular the SOLE, to attack this cryptosystem.
Second Order Linearization Equations
First, we will show algebraically why the MFE has second order linearization equations. Denote by M * the associated matrix of a square matrix;
, we have
From these, we can derive
that is,
From this matrix equation, we get four equations on its entries, which are of the form
and hold for any corresponding pair ( 
we get 4r equations of the form
where the coefficients a ijk , b ij , c i , d jk , e j , f ∈ K, and the summations are respectively over 1 ≤ i ≤ 12r, 1 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ 15r, and 1 ≤ j ≤ 15r. These equations, which are linear in plaintext components u i and quadratic in ciphertext components v j , are second order linearization equations (SOLEs). It is easy to show that when all the v j are substituted by any nonsingular ciphertext, the 4r SOLEs derived from (9) become linearly independent linear equations in u i .
Similarly to (6), we can deduce from (5) another equation
or in its matrix form,
The 4r SOLEs resulted from (11) are clearly different from the ones corresponding to (9). Furthermore, we can show that the 8r SOLEs obtained from (9) and (11) are all linearly independent. However, we note that when the v i in these 8r SOLEs derived from (7) and (11) are assigned any nonsingular ciphertext, we will get only 4r linearly independent linear equations in u i . In other words, once the values of v i are given, as linear equations in X i , (10) is completely equivalent to (6), and one can deduce (10) directly from (6) and vice versa. One can see this by the fact that multiplying from the right the both sides of (6) by Z * 3 Z 2 /det(Z 2 ) (this is a constant invertible matrix if the y i values are given) gives (10). Now, it is obvious that there are more SOLEs. We apply the above trick that results (6) and (10) from (5) to obtain
It is not hard to check that the polynomial equations derived from (6), (10), and (12)-(15) in terms of X i and Y j are all linearly independent. Thus, we get at least 24r linearly independent SOLEs in u i and v i over K.
To find all SOLEs, we need to evaluate sufficiently many plain/cipher-texts in (9) to get a system of linear equations on the a ijk , b ij , · · · , f. Let s be the dimension of its solution space and (a
(l) ), 1 ≤ l ≤ s, be its s linearly independent solutions. As mentioned above, we know s ≥ 24r. For attack purposes, we only need to do the computation to get all the SOLEs once for any given public key.
Similarly to the relation between (6) and (10), as linear equations in X i , (12) is equivalent to (13), and (14) is equivalent to (15) provided that the Y i are assigned a nonsingular ciphertext value.
In addition, we can show that if we are given the values of v i of a nonsingular ciphertext, from the 24r linearly independent SOLEs we derived above, we will produce only 8r linearly independent linear equations in u i . Write (12) in its matrix form: can be easily deduced from (6) and (12).
Ciphertext-only Attack
Now assume we have found a basis of the linear space of all SOLEs. Given a ciphertext (v 1 , · · · , v 15r ), our aim is to recover its plaintext (u 1 , · · · , u 12r ). We plug the values of ciphertext (v 1 , · · · , v 15r ) into the basis SOLEs:
giving us a linear system on u 1 , · · · , u 12r . Assume it has s linearly independent solutions. From the previous subsection, we know 8r ≤ s ≤ 12r. We can represent s of the variables u 1 , · · · , u 12r by linear affine expressions of the remaining t := 12r − s . Let w 1 , · · · , w t be these t variables.
Substitute these s linear expressions into the original public key polynomials to get 15r new quadratic polynomials h 1 (w 1 , ..., w t ), h 2 (w 1 , ..., w t ), · · · , and h 15r (w 1 , ..., w t ).
Let S be the solution space of (17). Let Y i and Z i be components and matrices corresponding to the given (v 1 , · · · , v 15r ), namely
We have found a basis of all SOLEs and each SOLE is a linear combination of this basis. This fact holds when the variables v i in the equations are substituted by v i . Applying this fact to (7), we know the four resulting equations in u i from
are all linear combinations of the equations in (17). In other words, (18) holds on S. It is easy to solve the following linear system on the a i and b j :
Essentially, this is to solve a linear equation system whose coefficients are the coefficients of the cross-terms and linear terms of the h i (w 1 , ..., w t ).
), 1 ≤ l ≤ p, be a basis of the solutions of (20). Set
For each (u 1 , ..., u 12r ) ∈ S, its corresponding (w 1 , ..., w t ) satisfies (21). From (21) we can represent p of the variables w 1 , ..., w t by the remaining t − p linearly. Totally, s + p components of the plaintext vector (u 1 , ..., u 12r ) are represented linearly by the remaining 12r − s − p.
Note that we surely have s + p ≥ 10r, since the matrix of the coefficients on X 1 , X 2 , · · · , X 12 of ten expansions in (16), (7), (X 
Finding the Plaintext
We substitute these linear expressions that result from solving (21), into h 1 (w 1 , ..., w t ), · · · , h 15r (w 1 , ..., w t ) to get 15r new quadratic polynomials on 12r − s − p (≤ 2r) variables. Denote them by h 1 , · · · , h 15r . Since 12r−s −p is very small (at most 8 and 10 for MFE-1 and MFE-1 , respectively), in principle, we can use the Gröbner basis method to solve the system
very easily to find the plaintext finally. However, we know here that we start from 15r equations; therefore we expect to get many more than 2r (the number of variables) equations. This means we can solve it easily, for example, using the XL method [CKPS00] . In our experiments, this set of equations does turn out to be very easy to solve.
A Practical Attack Procedure, Its Complexity and Experimental Verification
Our attack can be divided into the following four steps:
Step 1 of the attack: Find a basis of the linear space of the coefficient vectors (a ijk , b ij , · · · , f) of all SOLEs.
As mentioned in §3.1, this is solving a system of linear equations obtained by evaluating sufficiently many plain/cipher-texts in (9). There are . This number is 92659 and 178486 for r = 4 and 5, respectively, and is somewhat large. Choosing a number of plain/cipher-text pairs slightly more than the number of unknowns, say 1000, we can completely find the solution space in general. The complexity is respectively 92659 3 < 2 50 and 178486 3 < 2 52 using a naive Gaussian elimination. This step is an one-time computation for any given public key. Let (a The complexity of this step is 15rs 2 < (15r) 3 , and is less than 2 19 . Substitute these linear expressions into the original public key polynomials to get new quadratic polynomials h 1 (w 1 , ..., w t ), · · · , and h 15r (w 1 , ..., w t ) .
Step 3 of the attack: Solve the system (20) and obtain its solution basis
), 1 ≤ l ≤ p. Then solve the system (21) to find expression of the p components of the plaintext by the remaining 12r − s − p linearly.
The complexity of solving (20) is (15r + t) 3 < (30r) 3 < 2 22 , and that for (21) is pt 2 < (15r) 3 < 2 19 .
Step 4 of the attack: Derive new public key polynomials ( h 1 , · · · , h 15r ) from the solutions of (21), solve the system (22) and finally obtain the value of p components of the plaintext by using a Gröbner base or a linearization method. Then we use the linear expressions on the remaining plaintext components derived in in steps 2 and 3 to find the eliminated components.
Therefore the total attack complexity is less than 2 52 . The complexity of the attack recovering the plaintext (steps 2, 3 and 4) is less than 2 23 .
Experimental Results
We chose 10 different pairs of φ 1 and φ 3 and, for each of them, we chose 1000 different valid ciphertext for experiments. For all these ciphertexts, the attack successively found their corresponding plaintexts. The time-consuming step of our attack is the first step. In our experiments for MFE-1, we randomly selected 92800 plain/cipher-text pairs and substituted them into the public key. Then the main task is a Gaussian elimination on a 93800 × 92659 matrix on F 2 16 . For MFE-1 , we have to perform a Gaussian elimination on a 179600 × 178486 matrix. The time to do this Gaussian elimination will be rather long on a normal PC (more than one year according to our estimate). Instead, we performed our experiment on a DELL PowerEdge 7250, a minicomputer equipped with 4 Itanium2 CPU, 32GB ECC fully buffered DIMM memory, and a 64-bit Windows Server2003 operating system. We coded the attack using VC++, and used a multiple thread technique and a trick on multiplication on F 2 16 to speed up the Gaussian elimination.
It turns out that, in our experiments, 257 hours and 6 minutes (10 days and 17 hours and 6 minutes) was needed for the first step, which is an one-time computation, for any given public key of MFE-1. Only about 2 seconds were needed to execute the remaining steps. For MFE-1 , the time is 77 days and 3 seconds for the first step of the attack correspondingly.
Our computer experiments confirm that the dimension of SOLE is exactly 24r (step 1) and s is indeed 8r and p is 2r (step 3) for both MFE-1 and MFE
Extension of MFE and High Order Linearization Attack
The construction of MFE relies on the multiplicative structure of 2 × 2 matrices and it is not difficult to see that one can extend this construction in a straightforward way by using matrices of larger sizes m × m, for example, 3 × 3 or 4 × 4, to build new MFE cryptosystems. For any such an construction using matrix of m × m, it is not difficult to see that the m-th order LE can be applied to attack the cryptosystem. The fundamental reason behind is the formula that for any matrix Q of size m × m, we know that
where Q * is the associated matrix of Q. In terms of algebraic formulas for det(Q) and Q * , we know that det(Q) can be expressed as a degree m polynomial of the components Q ij of Q and each component of Q * can be expressed in terms of a degree (m − 1) polynomial of the components Q ij of Q. With this and the formulas (6) and (10) and other similar formulas, we can see that, for such a case, the order m linearization equations exists and they can be used to attack such a system. Therefore the current design of MFE needs to increase m substantially to avoid such an attack.
The Connection of HOLE with XL
One important point we want to make is that the HOLE method is closely related to the XL method [CKPS00] . In particular one may also explore the possibility of combining these two algebraic methods together to develop additional techniques.
Assume we are given a system of equations As a comparison, we find that if a HOLE with order D could be used to successfully attack a system by finding linear equations, then one should expect that the XL method should work as well. But the order of XL should be of degree 2D − 1 (the total degree is 2D + 1), because the v i in general are of degree 2. From this consideration, we conclude that though HOLE definitely cannot be a replacement for the XL method. Yet there could be cases that the HOLE method would be much more efficient than XL. In one case we consider polynomials of degree D + 1 (HOLE), while in the other case, we consider polynomials of degree 2D + 1 (XL). Another critical point is that when we use the HOLE method, the computation of HOLEs is performed only once for a given public key, then the HOLEs are used for any ciphertext; while the general XL algorithm needs to run its main part each time for different values of ciphertext. Thus one should think HOLE as a possibly more efficient alternative to XL, if it can work; and there would be cases that HOLE can work practically while the XL cannot.
More importantly, one may consider unifying the XL and HOLE methods. We may expect to efficiently solve the system of equations of the form:
From the point view of algebraic geometry, this definitely makes sense. But at this moment, we have not yet found any example where such a method could indeed be more efficient in an attack. Furthermore, one can expect that this method may be useful to attack other cryptosystems, such as symmetric ciphers.
